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NATIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA AND REVOLUTION: UNRAVELLING THE POLEMICS OF THE 1917–1919 IN UKRAINIAN PERIODICALS

*Національна інтелігенція та революція:
дискусія на сторінках української періодики у 1917–1919 pp.*

The purpose of the research is to study and introduce into scientific circulation a set of new sources contained in the pages of the Ukrainian periodicals of the national revolution of 1917–1919. The press of that time was a tribune from which representatives of various political movements and parties could proclaim their political programmes or declare their views on the current state of affairs, and propose changes for the future. Studying and analysing these statements allows researchers to take a completely different look at the history of those events. The methodology of the research is based on various principles of scientific research: historicism, objectivity, and systematicity, which determined the use of both general scientific (analytical, statistical, historical retrospective and perspective, synthesis and analysis) and special methods of study. This makes it possible to study historical processes and problems in a multifaceted and critical manner, to investigate the perception of historical events by representatives of a particular social group, and to determine the place of the «ordinary person» in the history of the country during the transitional period of revolutionary changes. The scientific novelty of the work lies in the study of personal reflections of individual

representatives of the intelligentsia as a social group that assumed responsibility for the entire country and people. The deep psychological reflections of the intellectual elite of the society of that time make it possible to clarify their views in the dichotomy of the «intelligentsia-people» system, the place of the intelligentsia in the preparation of the revolution, its place in the revolutionary events and to outline the results of the interaction of social groups. The Conclusions. The research has shown that even though intellectuals who considered themselves the main organisers of the revolution, its main guiding and driving force, which was primarily supposed to take advantage of the consequences of political and social changes, were deeply disappointed with its results. Considering themselves the «Messiah of the revolution», the intellectuals were shocked by the «ingratitudo» of the masses, who turned away from «their spiritual leaders» and did not appreciate the «self-sacrifice» of the intelligentsia on the altar of victory. It was again faced with two questions that always arise in times of crisis — «What to do?» and «Who is to blame?» — to which intellectuals were unable to give answers.

Keywords: revolution; emigration; Russian intelligentsia; Ukrainian periodicals; discussion.

Мета дослідження полягає у вивченні та введенні до наукового обігу комплексу нових джерел, що вміщені на сторінках української періодики часів національної революції 1917–1919 рр. Тогочасна преса, була трибуною з якої представники різних політичних течій та партій могли проголошувати політичні програми або заявляти про свої погляди на сучасний стан справ, пропонувати зміни на майбутнє. Вивчення та аналіз цих заяв дають дослідникам змогу з різних боків поглянути на історію тих подій. Методологія дослідження ґрунтується на різноманітних принципах: історизмі, об'єктивності, системності, які визначили застосування як загальнонаукових (аналітичного, статистичного, історичної ретроспективи й перспективи, синтезу й аналізу), так і спеціальних методів вивчення. Це дає змогу різnobічно та критично підійти до вивчення історичних процесів та проблем, дослідити сприйняття історичних подій серед представників окремої соціальної групи суспільства, визначити місце «звичайної людини» в історії країни у перехідний період революційних змін. Наукова новизна роботи полягає у дослідженні особистих рефлексій окремих представників інтелігенції як соціальної групи, що взяла на себе відповідальність за всю країну та народ. Глибокі психологічні роздуми представників інтелектуальної еліти тогочасного суспільства дають можливість з'ясувати їхні погляди в дихотомії системи «інтелігенція-народ», місця інтелігенції в підготовці революції, її місця у революційних подіях та окреслити результати взаємодії соціальних груп. Було встановлено: попри те, що представники інтелігенції, які вважали себе головними організаторами революції, її основною керівною

та рушийною силою, яка передусім повинна була скористатися наслідками політичних та соціальних змін виявилися глибоко розчаровані її результатами. Вважаючи себе «Месією революції» інтелігенція була шокована «невдовічністю» народних мас, які відвернулися від «своїх духовних лідерів» та не оцінили «самопожертву» інтелігенції, принесену на олтар перемоги. Перед нею знову постали два питання, які завжди виникають під час кризи — «Що робити?» та «Хто винний», на які представники інтелігенції так і не змогли дати відповіді.

Ключові слова: революція; еміграція; російська інтелігенція; українська преса; дискусія.

The current period of Ukraine's historical development is inextricably linked with the comprehensive socio-political and economic modernisation of Ukrainian society. That is why the most educated strata of Ukrainian society are coming to the fore and gaining in importance, as they are capable of organising and implementing the planned transformations in the country, which will bring it into the ranks of the most prosperous countries of the world community. In such circumstances, the study of the history of the formation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, its socio-cultural character, values and relations with intellectuals of other national groups in the process of historical development becomes one of the main tasks of national historical science. The historical and political realities of the National Liberation Revolution of 1917–1920 play an important role in these processes.

In our study, we propose the following hypothesis: revolutionary events fundamentally altered the role of the intelligentsia and its status within the society of that era. The revolution precipitated a worldview crisis and resulted in a loss of moral direction for many individuals within this social stratum. Consequently, the intelligentsia gradually transitioned from being a progressive political force advocating for radical change and the reformation of both the country and society into a conservative and reactionary entity.

To check the hypothesis, we employed a combination of general scientific methods — specifically empirical, theoretical, and complex methodologies — and specialized research techniques. Within empirical methods, we focused on observation and comparative analysis. For complex methods, we prioritized synthesis, analysis, and inductive and deductive reasoning, utilizing historical and logical approaches. Generalizations characterized the theoretical aspect of our methodology. This integration of diverse methodologies enabled us not only to examine and analyze materials from periodicals but also to derive significant generalizations and formulate comprehensive conclusions of the subject of our study.

As part of the general imperial intelligentsia and inextricably linked to the Russian intelligentsia, Ukrainian intellectuals radically diverged from their Russian counterparts during the turbulent period of revolutionary upheaval. The revolu-

tionary events, marked by major crises, led to civil war, the end of the Romanov Empire and attempts to create independent national states on its ruins. During this period, intellectuals often initiated and actively participated in revolutionary transformations. Nevertheless, the dominant role of this social class in public life was lost. As a result, a significant number of its representatives retreated into the shadows and ceased to engage in active political and professional activity. The revolution and the civil war not only split the intelligentsia as a social stratum, but also changed the inner world of the Russian intellectuals of that time, their system of values, forming new cultural guidelines and a new world view. Active work and revolutionary struggle were replaced by general apathy, self-absorption and attempts to understand the causes of failure and answer the questions of the times. Representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, participants in the revolutionary events, analysed the specific socio-economic, political and cultural conditions of the society of the time and tried to give a concrete answer to the question of why the relations between the people and the intelligentsia failed, what was the place of the intelligentsia in the revolutionary events and what to do next.

When analysing the historiography of the problem, it should be noted that emigrant, Soviet, and contemporary Russian historical literature is represented by numerous monographic studies, articles in scientific periodicals, and various types of scientific and journalistic works. The scientific research of the Soviet period covered certain aspects of the general problem (the participation of intellectuals in the revolutionary movement and the Russian Civil War, the formation of their political positions and guidelines, the development of their socio-political views, the peculiarities of their professional activity, the nature of their everyday life and way of life). While acknowledging the great value of works on the history of the intelligentsia of the Soviet period, it should be noted that they were all written to establish the official ideological theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, according to many researchers, e.g. O. Boiko (Бойко, О. Д. 1992), D. Dontsov (Донцов, Д. 2011–2016), I. Koliada (Коляда, I. 2006), Moskvych (Москвич, Л. Г. 1999), Sheiko (Шейко, В. М. 2019), the intelligentsia was always assigned a supporting, secondary role.

The historiography of modern times is characterised by a number of features due to the qualitative changes that have taken place in Russian historiography. There has been a radical revision of conceptual provisions, the scope of scientific research has expanded, and research into the history of various professional groups of intellectuals and provincial intellectuals has intensified (see: Касьянов, Г. В. 1992, Касьянов, Г. В. 1993, Касьянов, Г. В. 2004; Радчук, А. О. 2008; Sorokin, P. A. 2017). At the same time, it should be noted that the sphere of interest of Russian researchers has not yet included issues related to the stay of representatives of the Russian intellectual elite in the revolutionary period on the territory of independent Ukrainian national state entities.

Unfortunately, there is a lack of research on this issue in Ukrainian historiography as well. This is due not only to the divergence of scholarly interests, but also to a number of socio-political factors that have existed between Ukraine and Russia since their independence.

The subject of this publication is the discussion between representatives of the Russian emigration in Ukrainian periodicals in early 1919. The attempt by ordinary emigre intellectuals to understand their place in revolutionary events turned into a heated debate that revealed the characteristics of deviant behaviour inherent in the Russian intelligentsia of the time. This debate revealed the peculiarities of the collective consciousness of the entire social class. It revealed not only the crisis situation of the Russian intelligentsia at that time, but also the reasons for it.

When we think of the Russian intellectuals of the 1917–1920 revolution, we immediately recall the almost caricature-like image drawn by the writer Ivan Bunin in his «*Odessa Diaries*» of 1919. The future Nobel laureate wrote, not without irony and sarcasm: «A man on the street was screaming, with spit coming out of his mouth. His eyes seemed particularly frenzied; his pince-nez was all askew. A small tie stuck out from behind a dirty cotton collar; his waistcoat was splattered with mud; his jacket hung from his shoulders and was too short and tight; and his hair had dandruff and was greasy, sweaty, and disheveled. And people kept assuring me that this repulsive individual was supposedly seized by a “fiery selfless love for humanity” and a “thirst for beauty, justice, and good”»! (Бунін, І. 1998, с. 92). It should be noted, however, that not all representatives of the Russian intelligentsia fit this type. The majority of the intelligentsia were honest, courageous professionals, true patriots, ready to lay down their lives on the altar of the revolution without hesitation.

The overthrow of the monarchy in February 1917 caused an extraordinary spiritual upsurge that united society. The majority of intellectuals welcomed the start of the revolution, which they believed would eliminate everything old and conservative in life, culture and art, and open the way to productive work. The reforms of the Provisional Government, such as the abolition of the estates, the proclamation of civil liberties and the separation of church and state, initially gave hope of a gradual democratisation of society without radicalising the struggle. However, the Provisional Government was unable to overcome the crisis. The revolutionary illusions of most of the intelligentsia faded during 1917. Disillusionment with the Provisional Government grew as it failed to live up to the hopes of the intelligentsia. The further development of revolutionary events, which brought the Bolsheviks to power, provoked an even more negative reaction from some intellectuals.

The October Revolution and the subsequent dissolution of the Constituent Assembly were perceived as an attempt to seize power. The Bolshevik coup and civil war eventually split the Russian intelligentsia. Some condemned the new

government as a destructive force that would bring death to Russia and its culture, while others fully supported the Bolsheviks. However, the largest group of intellectuals adopted a position of non-intervention. This was due to the fact that, on the one hand, many representatives of this group were opposed to autocracy and did not support the political system that existed before the revolution, and, on the other hand, they did not understand the nature of Soviet power and were afraid of the revolutionary people. Life forced the intelligentsia either to cooperate with the new government, compromising their principles and gradually becoming Soviet employees loyal to the new regime, or to emigrate. Mistrust of the new government, the lack of political freedoms and guarantees, and the growing scale of the Red Terror were compounded by economic hardship, hunger and unemployment. In his letters, the Russian artist Alexander Pligin, who was living and working in Moscow in early 1918, described the situation of the intelligentsia as «...the main thing is the loss of will and energy. But I fight, I fight hard. It's hard, I can't find myself...» and then added that «the contemporary public doesn't take into account the artist's desires and melancholy. I am so broke now that I have rarely been like this before» (Баранова, С. 1994). He was supported by the former director of the 1st St Petersburg Cadet Corps, General F. O. Gryhoriev. In his diary for July 1918, he wrote: «Former aristocrats and intellectuals trade in shops, cafes, ride as hares; in the tram and speculate: having bought flour from sackers, they do not hesitate to sell it again...»¹.

In search of a way out of this situation, representatives of the Russian intelligentsia began to leave en masse for the neighbouring Ukrainian state, where the situation was much better at the time. This is how Arnold Goldenweiser, an influential figure in the Jewish political movement, recalled in his memoirs: «Everyone who could, as far as they could, rushed south to us. Kyiv, albeit for a short time, became a real all-Russian centre. The boards of all banks, couriers and aristocratic circles came to us. They were followed by intellectuals — lawyers, professors, journalists. Everyone was in a hurry to get to Kyiv» (Гольденвейзер, А. А. 1991). Russian intellectuals settled not only in the capital. Ivan Bunin worked in the Odesa newspaper Nashe Slovo «...which we, the former employees of Russkoe Slovo, began to publish in March in full confidence of a more or less quiet existence until we returned to Moscow». However, the population of Ukraine did not welcome the waves of emigrants with much joy. A contemporary of the events, V. Myakotin (Мякотин, В. 1991), recalled: «These refugees were dominated by people with solid wealth... not restraining themselves in spending, they accelerated the process of price growth. On this basis, the local Kyivan population grew dissatisfied with the newcomers, and the local Ukrainian press, for its part, tried in every way to inflate such

¹ Завидую сверстникам, скончавшимся до революции (из дневников Ф. А. Григорьева) // Родина. 1995. № 8. С. 32–38.

discontent, attributing to almost all Great Russians the blackest and most evil designs against Little Russia, all the while persecuting these Muscovites; with the Ukrainian; they eat in Kyiv». The relatively free life of the Russian intelligentsia in Ukraine during the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, who massively recruited them to the civil service, changed dramatically with the coming to power of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). «The time of the Directory's rule, which lasted only six weeks, was a time of the most unbridled Ukrainian nationalism and Russophobia», an eyewitness recalled. «The use of the Russian language was not allowed, even alongside Ukrainian». (Гольденвейзер, А. А. 1991). Language discrimination was condemned and became one of the reasons why the Russian intelligentsia did not accept the Ukrainian revolution. Most of the Russian intelligentsia living in Ukraine at that time continued to perceive it and the Directory regime as «...something not real, something that cannot and does not have the right to exist separately from Great Russia». The new government of the restored UPR introduced the «labour principle», on the basis of which a new electoral system for the authorities was to be formed. The labour formula excluded not only the Russian intelligentsia living in Ukraine and hoping to gain political rights, but also the Russified Ukrainian intelligentsia. The Ukrainian national intelligentsia, which came to power as a result of the victorious anti-Hetman uprising, had a negative attitude towards their Russian «colleagues in the shop», rightly considering them political rivals in the struggle for power in Ukraine and carriers of anti-Ukrainian state sentiment. The unwillingness of the Great Russians to see an independent Ukrainian state led by the national intelligentsia increasingly alienated Ukrainians from the Russians.

However, from mid-January 1919, the military, political and economic situation in the UPR began to deteriorate rapidly. The Directory's declaration of war against Soviet Russia led to a broad offensive by Bolshevik armies in Ukraine. Between 18 and 26 January, Red Army troops occupied Poltava, Bohuchar, Luhansk, Konotop, Bakhmach, and Katernoslav, and on 5 February, Kyiv. Even earlier, on 28 January, the Directory left the capital and moved to Vinnytsia. Together with the Directorate, the government, and the army, a significant number of intellectuals left Kyiv, «continuing the sad refugee journey», especially those who had already experienced all the «benefits» of the Soviet system and the horrors of the Bolshevik regime.

It was in Vinnytsia, which for a time became the new political centre of the UPR, that representatives of the Russian intelligentsia had the opportunity and time to reflect on the role played by intellectuals in the tumultuous revolutionary events. The debate erupted on the pages of the local newspaper «Podolskoye Slovo» after an article by P. Ordynsky (Ординський, П. 1919) with the loud title «Pro domo sua» (Latin — in Defence of One's Own House).

Reflecting on the role of the intelligentsia in the history of Russia, the author refers «to those ancient times... when social relations were so simple that agrarian reform was conceived and implemented according to the programme of Omelyan Pugachev — to equalise everyone with a three-armed grave», when, according to P. Ordynsky, in the era of «broad figures and their own voices», the almost forgotten custom of amusing oneself with an honest fist fight was born. The fight was started by «boys-brawlers» who ran away immediately after the start. After one side started to win, «the whole camp of shouters belonging to the fighting parties would raise a ruckus: dibs, dibs, you can't do that, it's not according to the rules. But no one paid attention to them. After the battle, the whole crowd, shouting and screaming, hovered around the winners, trying to please them as best they could». He goes on to write: «When I think about the role of the intelligentsia in the history of the modern revolution, for some reason, the boys who were brawlers come to mind. When the ranks of the bourgeoisie and democracy did not dare to make the first strike, the spiritual men on both sides shouted, incited to battle at rallies, meetings and in the newspapers. And the struggle began... the intelligentsia stepped aside and declared itself neutral. They swear and spit in impotent anger. The other part, a minority, tries to take part in the struggle of the titans, running, fussing underfoot and shouting loudly. These enthusiasts... try to force the participants of the revolution to follow the theoretical rules of the struggle, not wanting to realise the insignificance of their efforts. The enthusiasts will die in this struggle and will be destroyed by the victor. Whoever wins, will always use the services of the intelligentsia, sometimes reluctantly, more often with disgust and disgust. The winner is forced to do so by the situation. After all, neither party can steer the ship of state on its own, one because of its dark ignorance, the other because of its small numbers, laziness and unwillingness to work...». The author concludes the article: «The last outburst of heroism and the desire to show their right to influence in the country was the sabotage of Soviet power in Great Russia. This struggle saw the death of the intelligentsia as a class and the split into camps of a small handful of enthusiasts and a huge mass of neutrals whose lives resemble Shchedrin's wise gudgeon, full of terror for tomorrow and concern about the disfavour of the powers that be. Every day a handful of enthusiasts are melting away and the neutral intelligentsia, which until recently was so proud of its rank and position, is being sucked deeper into the mud of everyday life and moral decay» (Ординский, П. П. 1919).

Undoubtedly, this publication is the result of the author's long reflections and experiences. However, he did not expect that he would raise a topic that was of concern to many at the time and raise questions to which many were looking for answers. The unexpected response generated by the article was a pleasant surprise for the author. The first to respond was journalist S. Rapoport. His article «Pygmalion and the Great Mute» was published in the next issue of *Podilske Slo-*

vo of 12 March 1919 (Рапопорт, С. 1919). Disagreeing with P. Ordynsky, the author emphasises that in none of the European languages does the word «intelligentsia» and «intellectual» exist in the sense that is used in Russian. While in Europe an intellectual is someone who is engaged in intellectual work, in Russian reality, according to S. Rapoport, it is almost synonymous with a revolutionary. In his opinion, the Russian intelligentsia is similar to the hero of the ancient Greek myth, the master Pygmalion, who created Galatea. In the same way, the Russian intelligentsia «seeks, collects and revives this power of the great mute». The great mute is a people who have been sleeping for centuries and could not wake up. And only the intelligentsia was able to wake up the people, prepare them and lead them. However, it so happened that «in the revolutionary drama it was left without a role» and therefore «withdrew, retreated into its own separate world of ideas, hopes and aspirations». This explains the passivity of the intelligentsia in the revolutionary events. At the same time, he expresses the hope that «the Russian intelligentsia will once again take on the great mission of Pygmalion, the creator, and will continue to carry on its great work» (Рапопорт, С. 1919).

The next participant in the discussion was lawyer A. Polatsky, who appeared in the next issue of the newspaper with an article «In defence of the intelligentsia» (Поляцкий, А. 1919). «You cannot turn a tragedy into vaudeville. The deep tragedy experienced by the Russian intelligentsia must be approached cautiously, without jokes», the author writes, and continues to note that «the Russian intelligentsia has never played the role of boys and girls. The intelligentsia did not cheer on the fighters, it went to suffering and death for the people. Worse, it went to terror and murder contrary to its inner convictions». According to the author, the Russian intellectual had no personal life for decades. Giving all his strength in the struggle against autocracy, the Russian intellectual gave up all the benefits of life, but «Galatea came to life and immediately pounced and sank her claws into Pygmalion's body. A great gulf opened between the Russian intelligentsia and the Russian people. The "great mute" who had been silent for centuries spoke, and it turned out that his language had nothing to do with the language of the Russian intelligentsia. The people and the intelligentsia were on different levels of culture. Their demands for the political moment diverged sharply, and their methods of struggle and self-assertion were diametrically opposed. Worst of all, Galatea did not recognise Pygmalion himself». According to Polatsky (Поляцкий, А. 1919), the people did not appreciate the intelligentsia and its sacrifices. In addition, the people brought the entire intelligentsia under a common denominator — «cadet» — and pushed it away from them. To overcome this gap, the intelligentsia has two ways: either it will lower itself to the level of the masses and then dissolve into them, or it will intensify its energy many times over, continue its cultural work to raise the level of the masses, bring them closer to itself and overcome the abyss on the edge of which it found itself. Stating the

significant gap between the intelligentsia and the people, the author of the article speaks of the practical destruction of the intelligentsia as a class, of its «falling out» of the very social structure of Russian society. The next to join the discussion was M. Germanov, who in his article «The People and the Intelligentsia» attempted not only to express his own thoughts, justify his view of the problem, but also to summarise the predecessors and summarise the results of the discussion (Германов, М. 1919).

At the beginning of his article, he devastatingly criticises the views of the other participants in the discussion. Agreeing that the situation of the Russian intelligentsia is indeed tragic, he uncompromisingly denies P. Ordynsky and S. Rapoport that nothing can be changed, that the intelligentsia has already played its historical role and must give way to other social groups, and that its future is to serve those who will win the revolutionary struggle. Continuing his thought, M. Germanov (Германов, М. 1919) asks the question «what is the Russian intelligentsia» and what are the reasons for the tragic situation in which it has found itself. Answering these questions, he states that «the Russian intelligentsia cannot be identified with Russian revolutionaries and revolutionary circles. This is only a part (perhaps the best part) of the entire Russian intelligentsia. The cadet is an intellectual, as is the district doctor, the prosecutor, the excise officer who likes to philosophise, and the endless cohort of Chekhov's heroes. We talk about the existence of the intelligentsia as a class. But this is actually a curiosity, a tragic curiosity of Russian reality. And this curiosity is the source of the catastrophic situation of the Russian intelligentsia».

The author goes on to write that «the considerable cultural backwardness of the masses, the deep gulf that exists between their way of life, psyche, the whole structure and those elements that have received schooling and cultural training — these are the reasons that led to the fact that the most heterogeneous, often opposite in political views, elements were united in the imagination of the people, on the basis of the mere sign of intelligence's, into a single opposing class. That is why all intellectuals are «cadets».

According to Germanov (Германов, М. 1919), the mistake of the Russian intelligentsia is that in the endless debates, where «some slogans and theories were opposed to other theories and slogans, both of which pursued the same goal — the people's welfare», it overlooked the fact that the people are absolutely indifferent to the very carriers of these theories and slogans, regardless of their party affiliation. He then adds that the people and the intelligentsia do not even have a common language in which to speak. «In England, a lord and a simple peasant have much more in common in terms of interests, concepts and words than a Russian man and any intellectual. The Russian intelligentsia in general talked a lot and did very little. Therefore, it was completely detached from the people. Herzen considered this a disease. He was a prophet. But the disease turned out

to be incurable and fatal. The people rose up and destroyed all those who spoke alien and incomprehensible words».

Thus, the participants of the discussion tried to answer the main questions posed by the Russian intelligentsia of the 19th and early 20th centuries: «who is to blame» and «what to do». And while on the first question, all the authors agreed that the intelligentsia was to blame for finding itself in such a terrible situation, there was no unequivocal answer to the second question.

P. Ordynskyi (Ординський, П. 1919) believed that the intelligentsia had no choice but to die in the revolutionary struggle or to join the service of the one who would win the revolution. S. Rapoport (Рапопорт, С. 1919) and A. Polatsky (Поляцький, А. 1919) emphasised that the intelligentsia should isolate itself from revolutionary events, as it had fulfilled its mission, and wait until the need for it arose again and the people called on it. The journalist M. Germanov (Германов, М. 1919) could not answer this question at all. But all the participants in the discussion agreed on one thing: the people did not understand and did not accept the ideas and aspirations of the intelligentsia. The people, whom the intelligentsia sought to wake up from several hundred years of sleep, because of their educational backwardness and cultural limitations, did not recognise the leading role of the intelligentsia in the revolutionary processes, did not follow it, but, on the contrary, were extremely hostile to it.

In this situation, the position taken by the conscious Ukrainian national intelligentsia is of particular interest. Following the debate, an unknown author, writing under the pseudonym V. Z-ii, published an article in the newspaper «Life of Podillya» entitled «Ukrainian Intellectuals and the Intelligentsia of Ukraine» (3-ий, В. 1919). He wrote: «It has been 12 months since the beginning of the revolution, 20 months since the first time the slogan “organise yourselves” was heard among the scattered common people. The intelligentsia, thanks to its understanding and greater mobility, was the first to form numerous organisations. However, their weakness and inability to work, brought up by the Russian school, led to the fact that numerous organisations began to wither away, and by the time workers and peasants formed very vigorous organisations, the intellectuals’; bodies had already begun to wither away. Part of the reason for this was the Russification of our intellectual commoners: when the people put their organisations on a national Ukrainian position, our urban intelligentsia took a pan-Russian position...

Now that... the purely national intelligentsia — the Ukrainian intelligentsia — has squeezed out and is showing extraordinary energy in the heat of creativity, in the heat of struggle, the Russian and Russianised intelligentsia in Ukraine either grumbles or keeps silent with gritted teeth and, in its powerless frailty, dreams of help from the outside: it pins its last hopes, together with the bourgeoisie, on someone. She thinks that someone will come and restore her past dominance, maybe the Japanese, or Denikin and his “volunteers”, or the Entente with the

famous Enno. Their last hopes are disappearing one by one, and they are stubbornly dreaming, stubbornly waiting for a miracle. Poor fantasists!» (3-й, В. 1919). Without losing hope, the author continues to hope that «...all the intelligentsia... in Ukraine must understand with whom they should associate. The Ukrainian conscious intelligentsia expects the entire intelligentsia of Ukraine to show its organising, creative state mind and to lead all nationalities of Ukraine to a better future in full cooperation and contact. ...the non-Ukrainian democratic intelligentsia will not, in the name of the ideals of Russian imperialism, hinder the creative work of Ukrainian democracy». And finally, the author emphasises that a clearly defined political position of the intelligentsia will finally convince «Ukrainian democracy... whether it can see enemies or friends in those who here in Ukraine bear the honourable name of “intellectual workers». And the people will then finally understand the difference between an intellectual and a «lord» — landlord.

While peasants and workers can be forgiven a little, the intelligentsia should be demanded to do more. To whom much is given, much will be asked» (3-й, В. 1919).

The Bolshevik victory in the Civil War radically changed the socio-political situation not only in Ukraine, but in almost all the territories that were part of the former Russian Empire. The new government was distrustful of the intellectual class, restricting their rights and subjecting them to repression. For many years, the intelligentsia lost its place in the social structure of the new state. It is not surprising that the last point in the discussion was put by the agronomist Ya. Grin, who actively supported the Bolshevik government and its policies. In his article «Intellectuals and Soviet Power» (Грин, Я. 1919), he not only expressed his position on the problem of the place and role of the intelligentsia in revolutionary events, but also tried to summarise the results of the discussion and draw conclusions for the future. He argued that: «The revolutionary path of the intelligentsia, which had glorious pages in the history of the liberation movement, ended before the October Revolution. At the decisive moment of the struggle... the intelligentsia, which liked to talk about “freedom”; and the welfare of the people's, became hostile to the government of workers and peasants». Assessing the role of the intelligentsia in the revolutionary processes, he emphasised its mediating functions, reducing them to secondary and generally insignificant. «Occupying a position between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia tried to smooth out the sharp corners of the class struggle... by imposing a price on the old world». That is why, in his opinion: «The intelligentsia felt superfluous in the people's struggle for a better life». In his reflections, he concluded that: «The two years of Soviet power proved that only under the rule of the workers is it possible to liberate mental labour, and that the intellectuals can work creatively to create a brighter, fairer life for all, not just for the servitude of the exploiting class. There has never been unity or common interests among the intelligentsia. Today there

is a turning point, intellectuals who are close to the proletariat in their position are abandoning their previous ideology and are gradually being drawn into the circle of proletarian interests. The rest, «who do not forget anything and whom the revolution has not taught anything», will be thrown into the dustbin of history, because the proletariat has eliminated the monopoly of the intelligentsia on knowledge and is gradually beginning to learn everything itself, so it does not need «such intelligentsia» (Германов, М. 1919). Unfortunately, Ya. Grin's conclusions were quickly confirmed by the cruel reality.

To sum up, it should be emphasised that during the revolution and civil war, the intelligentsia lost its privileged position in the structure of Russian society. It lost not only a number of economic privileges, but also a special social status. The loss of its dominant position led to a sharp conflict between the intelligentsia and the authorities. The years of revolutionary turmoil led to a split in the intelligentsia as a coherent social stratum. The revolution changed the inner world of the intellectuals of that time, formed new cultural guidelines, new symbols of their consciousness, a new system of values, and a new worldview.

Secondly, during the civil war, the phenomenon of deviant behaviour of the intelligentsia was formed, which manifested itself in a change in the nature of the realisation of their own potential. The intelligentsia stopped working to rebuild society, and instead acted to destroy it, deepening the socio-political crisis. The deviant behaviour of the Russian intelligentsia was the result of a crisis of world-view and loss of moral guidelines. These factors, in turn, were caused by disappointment with the Russian Revolution, its inconsistency with the ideal image that generations of intellectuals had fought to embody.

The revolution also changed the collective consciousness of the intelligentsia. A significant part of it, having compromised its principles, cooperated with the new government, becoming the foundation of the so-called «new Soviet intelligentsia». The other part, which could not come to terms with the Bolshevik regime, increasingly felt like a victim of a social experiment, which was manifested in the public consciousness in the formation of a new psychosocial complex of «victimhood», joined the anti-Bolshevik struggle, or was forced to emigrate from Soviet Russia abroad.

Even in such a short discussion, with the participation of a few intellectuals, in addition to rational thinking, all the negative traits inherent in the representatives of the Russian intellectual elite of that time were clearly manifested: unwillingness to listen and understand the opponent, criticism, attempts to impose one's own opinion at any cost, narrow political interests, belief in one's messianic destiny, self-absorption, detachment from life, and conformism.

The Russian intelligentsia was unable, and even unwilling, to seek compromises, to take steps towards a common anti-Bolshevik struggle with representatives of the national elites of the former Russian Empire. In turn, all attempts

by representatives of the Ukrainian political leadership to win over the Russian intelligentsia to their side were met with a blank wall of misunderstanding of the common struggle against a common enemy. The rejection by the Great Russian intelligentsia of the idea of creating an independent UPR and the desire of the Ukrainian people to build their own independent state was one of the reasons for the defeat of the national liberation revolution in Ukraine.

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THE OTAMANSHIP (1918–1919): THROUGH THE EYES OF CONTEMPORARIES AND HISTORIANS

Отаманщина (1918–1919 pp.): очима сучасників та істориків

У статті зроблено спробу проаналізувати історіографію отаманщини, виокремити її як унікальне явище Української революції 1917–1921 рр. Розглянуто отаманщину як різновид протестного суспільного руху, спрямованого проти політики Директорії, крізь призму сприйняття серед очевидців подій. Виділено особливості інтерпретації тогодчасної ситуації подальшиими дослідниками отаманщини, її лідерами та учасниками. Проаналізовано праці очевидців подій та істориків про діяльність отаманів. Висвітлено оцінки сучасників, які вони дали формам боротьби Директорії з отаманщиною та її наслідками.

Ключові слова: отаманщина, історіографія, Українська революція 1917–1921 рр., Директорія УНР, Петлюра, ватажок.

This article is devoted to analysing otamanship as a social phenomenon that emerged during the period of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) (1918–1919). The study focuses on the historiographical examination of this phenomenon, considering the works of contemporaries of the events and historians from different periods. Otamanship is characterized as a specific type of protest movement that possessed both social-revolutionary and destructive features. The approach to typologizing the historiography of otamanship by chronology, geography, and the attitude of study authors toward this social phenomenon